On May 14, 2016, the Parliament of Georgia adopted amendments to the Organic Law on Constitutional Court and to the Law of Georgia on Constitutional Proceedings in the third reading. The draft amendments were proposed by the Parliamentary Committee of Human Rights and Civil Integration.

It should be noted that after the first hearing, the consideration of the draft amendments was hastened and the bill was adopted in the three readings with only few hours of internals between them. In addition, the amendments adopted in the first reading, as well as the completely new initiatives proposed during the second hearing, were not publicly available before the Committee session.

It is necessary the legislative process of consideration and adoption of a legislative initiative to be open and the possibility of a broad public discussion about important topics of public interest to be ensured. The Public Defender of Georgia considers that despite the importance and the role of the Constitutional Court, these principles were ignored during consideration of the amendments at the committee and plenary sessions.

It should also be noted that despite the importance of the issue and the existed expectations, the draft amendments had not been submitted to the Venice Commission for a legal opinion. In particular, on May 11, 2016, at the end of the visit to Georgia, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) co-rapporteurs said in their joint statement that they welcomed the intention of the Chair of the Committee of Human Rights and Civil Integration concerning submission of the draft amendments with regard to the Constitutional Court's competence to the Venice Commission for an appropriate report before considering the bill in the 2^nd reading.

However, the Committee of Human Rights and Civil Integration adopted the legislative package in the 3rd reading in a few hours (non-working hours) after it was approved in the 2^nd reading at the plenary session.

As for the content of the amendments, it should be noted that the Constitutional Court's decision will take full effect after its full declaration and publication on the Constitutional Court's website, instead of publication in the "Legislative Herald" as it was proposed by the primary version of the bill. We welcome this change, which was a recommendation of the Public Defender and the civil society.

However, there are a number of problematic issues with regard to the amendments, which could endanger the fast and efficient functioning of the Constitutional Court. In particular, the changes concern the following areas:

Under the current law, the plenum of the Constitutional Court is authorized to review a case on its merits and make a decision, if the session is attended by 6 out of 9 judges. Now the quorum will be increased from 6 of 7 members. In addition, the quorum required for decision-making (including for suspension of a norm) was increased to fixed 6 members (2/3 of the total composition of judges), while under the current law, decisions are made by more than a half of the plenum attendees. Establishment of such a high quorum for making a decision may in some cases complicate protection of constitutional rights. According to the practices existed in the legal systems of the vast majority of continental European countries, Constitutional Court's decision requires a simple majority. The Venice Commission estimates that there are only few exceptions to this rule, and only with regard to the specific competencies of constitutional courts. [1]

In addition, the amendments authorize only one member of the Constitutional Court collegium, who does not agree with the majority's decision, to request transfer of the case to the plenum. Like the abovementioned, these changes pose a threat to timely and effective resolution of the dispute by the Constitutional Court collegium.

It should be noted that apart from establishing a high quorum for the decision-making, the circle of matters to be considered by the Constitutional Court plenum has also been increased. The plenum will consider any dispute concerning the constitutionality of the norms of organic laws in relation to human rights, as well as suspension of a disputed normative act or its part, if the act could cause irreparable consequences for one of the parties. The plenum also considers disputes over constitutionality of the norms regulating the election and referendum issues as well as the constitutionality of elections.

According to the amendments, the Constitutional Court judge automatically terminates activities after expiration of his/her 10-year term of office. Similar blanket restriction means that the newly appointed judges, in addition to the new suits, will have to reconsider the cases reviewed on the merits by previous judges. Accordingly, the change, in some cases, may pose a threat to effective protection of the rights of plaintiffs, and fast and effective implementation of the principle of justice. It should be noted that the current legislation does not establish a maximum limit of extension of the 10-year term for Constitutional Court judges for making final decisions. It was important the authors of the legislative initiative to develop an optimal proposal that would promote both the protection of the principle of justice and timely decision-making in case of extension of the 10-year term of judges during consideration of cases on the merits.

The Public Defender stresses that the most important guarantee of protection of human rights and freedoms is the existence of an independent judiciary, while the Constitutional Court represents a crucial institution for legal protection of human rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution. It is a judicial body of constitutional control, which has great important for the development of the rule of law, democracy, separation of state powers and implementation of the requirements of the Constitution.

It is important that the reform planned in the justice system, including with regard to the Constitutional Court, be carried out with the broad engagement of the civil society and relevant institutions.

Considering the above, the Public Defender considers that the legislative process related to the review and approval of legislative changes to the Constitutional Court was not transparent and did not provide for an opportunity to hold a broad public discussion on the issues of particular importance. In addition, the Public Defender considers that the amendments adopted by the Parliament may jeopardize effective and quick functioning of the Constitutional Court. It is important all state institutions, involved in the judicial reform process, to realize that the Constitutional Court, as an independent and impartial judicial structure, has the most important role in the country's democratic development and stability.